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When an historian decides to explore a recent topic, (s)he usually has a lot of 
already published material to begin work with. Ivo Lučić did not have that privilege, 
making his book Uzroci rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine 
(Causes of the War: Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1980 and 1992) even more 
valuable. Most of the primary material used in the book are unpublished documents 
from the archives, collected by the author over the years. I would dare to say that 
his book is truly the first study that deals with the social and political situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1980s in a serious and scholarly way. I hope his 
work inspires other scholars to take the same approach in research of the other ex-
Yugoslav republics. This study is a real refreshment after numerous books about 
ʻBosniaʼ,1 in which their authors show, more or less, a visible lack of basic local 
knowledge, reproducing predominant narrative constructs about this country and its 
past. 
The book consists of three parts. The first part explores various aspects of 
cultural and political life after the death of Josip Broz, such as the militarization of 
society, the cases of Međugorje and Duvno, the Agrokomerc affair, the Kecmanović 
affair, ʻnaziʼ birthday in Sarajevo, etc. The second part deals with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during the early 1990s, while the third part provides detailed 
deconstruction of the Karađorđevo myth concerning the ʻpartitionʼ of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina between Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman.2 
One of the myths about Bosnia-Herzegovina is that of prewar unity and 
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina is frequently refered to as ʻBosniaʼ in Western discourse. The shortening of 
this countryʼs long name is not as benign as it might look at first sight. It simplifies the picture of 
Bosnia to a national state of the Bosniaks, and eliminates from the narrative the Serbs and Croats who 
represent around 50% of the population. 
2 The ideas were developed earlier in Lučić (2003). 
Croatian Studies Review 9 (2013) 
108
multiculturalism among its constituent nations. The author points out numerous 
examples which suggest that the situation was quite the opposite. For example, after 
the death of Josip Broz the number of political prisoners in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
rose no less than 83%. Lučić also presents the evidence that only 12% of Croats in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were members of the Communist party and that their 
political leaders did not have any legitimacy among the people. Singing Croatian 
national-patriotic songs in Herzegovina in the 1980s resulted in regular 
incarceration of the singers and lengthy jail sentences. At the same time, an 
eccentric private birthday in Sarajevo, which used iconography from the times of 
Nazi Germany, resulted only in verbal warnings due to the high social status of 
participants. Lučić convincingly shows that the fabric of society in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the 1980s was already deeply divided and the feeling of unity was 
not related to this republic's identity but rather to Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism. 
In the second part of the book the author discusses the first democratic 
elections and the problems that arose afterwards amongst the winning political 
parties. The main problem of disagreement was the political and constitutional 
arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as each of its constituent nations had 
different visions for its future. Paradoxically, the situation today in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is not much different. 
Although it is difficult to disagree with most of what is written in the book, I 
cannot agree with two details. The first one is Lučićʼs statement about the 
constituent position of the Serbs in Croatia (p. 19). The author correctly points out 
that the Constitution in the Communist regime does not have any significant 
importance (p. 379). The Yugoslav Constitution was written with very unclear 
wording, leaving it open to different interpretation. The formulation of Croatia as: 
the “national republic of Croats, republic of Serbs and republic of other minorities” 
is an example of such double meaning, because nowhere is it explained what this 
means. Some say this formulation means that Croatia is also a national republic of 
the Serbs, however, it can also point out the special status of the Serbs who are 
more than a minority but less than a constituent nation. The second detail is the 
statement that “ethnic cleansing was legalized in Dayton” (p. 470). I would rather 
agree with Pehar,3 that this is legally and ethically impossible, because crimes can 
not be legalized in the Constitution, although, indeed, ethnic cleansing did occur. 
It is a pity that on occasion the author does not elaborate more on presented 
facts (especially in the first part of the book), beacuse it is obvious that he has much 
more to say. After reading the book, I hope we will soon have the chance to read its 
natural second part about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
XXX 
Another book discussed here is: Vrijeme Europe: Zapadne sile i raspad Jugoslavije, 
the Croatian translation of The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and Breakup of 
Yugoslavia, published in 2011 by Josip Glaurdić. Altough the book deals with 
almost the same problems as the second part of Ivo Lučićʼs book, it approaches 
3 Pehar (2011): 133. 
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them in quite the opposite way. The book is methodologically inconsistent; the 
author tells stories in poetic language inappropriate for a scientific book and 
ʻresolvesʼ problems without pointing out that something is not known or something 
should be explored more. For example, the author takes an interview of the elderly 
former Yugoslav admiral Branko Mamula in Death of Yugoslavia in the 1990s as 
trustworthy, although Mamula spoke about the events from the 1980s – how he had 
told Milan Kučan that opposition will overthrow him and breakup Yugoslavia (p. 
25). He also takes the statements about the Milošević-Tuđman meeting at 
Karađorđevo by Stipe Mesić and Dušan Bilandžić as trustworthy. However, he does 
not bother to mention the role of Mesić in overthrowing the moderate Stjepan Kljuić 
as president of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian HDZ. Instead of mentioning Mesić by 
name, he gives an expression that does not reveal much – it was the ʻBoban wingʼ 
which overthrew Kljuić (p. 264). 
Beside methodology, Glaurdić incorrectly uses terminology on occasions. For 
example, he continually uses the term ʻYugoslavsʼ when referring to the population 
of Yugoslavia. The term ʻYugoslavsʼ has been used to describe the people who 
declared themselves to be of Yugoslav nationality, while the population of 
Yugoslavia should rather be referred to as ʻcitizens of Yugoslaviaʼ. Another term 
that the author continually uses wrongly is ʻethnicalʼ instead of ʻnationalʼ. In 
Yugoslavia (and elsewhere in the Balkans) nationhood rather than citizenship 
provided membership in a nation, unlike most Western countries.4 
Glaurdić is highly subjective and biased throughout the whole of his book. 
For example he blames Western powers for not helping the last Yugoslav 
primeminister Ante Marković (p. 69), which is an idea already found in the work of 
David Gibbs.5 The author also shows a complete misunderstanding of the situation 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He claims that “Bosnia and Herzegovina was defined in the 
Yugoslav constitution as a state, just like other republics” (p. 217). The main 
problem is that Bosnia and Herzegovina was not like the other republics because it 
had three constituent nations instead of one. This basic misunderstanding leads 
Glaurdić to think about Bosnia and Herzegovina as a national unitary state of 
Muslims/Bosniaks, in which they are supremely sovereign and have the right to 
decide for the rest. The author thus considers sovereignty as something that can be 
confirmed and established by the declaration of a Communist republic assembly (p. 
217). He does not take into account that a Communist republic assembly in former 
Yugoslavia was not legitimately elected, so that sovereignty must be partially 
usable in practice, not only on a piece of paper. Bosnia and Herzegovina was not 
sovereign in 1992 either, because the organized political power fell apart after the 
establishment of  the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna and the separation of the 
territories held by the Serbs. Glaurdić here again shows a basic misunderstanding of 
the situation by comparing Herceg-Bosna, which consistently supported the unity of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and its authority, to the Republika Srpska which openly 
challenged the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The central (Bosniak-majority) 
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina also  lacked control of state organs of 
                                                          
4 Roudometof (2002): 20. 
5 Gibbs (2009). 
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coercion (police, military and territorial defence) on more than half of the territory 
claimed as their own. Besides this, in the referendum on independence day held on 
29 February and 1 March 1992, at least one third of the population explicitly said 
that they did not want to live in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Both books are their authorsʼ debut. Ivo Lučić showed innovation in 
providing new facts and the deconstruction of myths and stereotypes, providing a 
stimulus for new perspectives in this field. Josip Glaurdić reflects existing myths 
and stereotypes despite new literature, which is quite the opposite, providing an 
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